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century in Fibrosa,20 “The mills of the law grind slowly”. In this matter of the relation-
ship between causes of action and remedies, it is time that the case law mills started 
to grind.
Robin Evans-Jones
University of Aberdeen
No Place Like Holme: Community Expectations 
and the Right to Buy
When the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 20031 came into force, a vast area of Scotland 
became “registrable” within the terms of section 33.2 Since then, many communities 
have sought to utilise the powers which the Act confers to take control of land in their 
area. Unlike communities before it, however, the community based in the Holmehill 
area of Dunblane was unsuccessful in its attempt to acquire ownership, as the Scottish 
Ministers decided that its community interest was not suitable for registration and 
could proceed no further. The community’s appeal against the Ministerial decision was 
refused on 27 April 2006 by Sheriff J C C McSherry, leaving the decision unchanged 
and the community disappointed.3 This case is of particular interest to land law practi-
tioners, providing as it does the fi rst judicial interpretation of the Land Reform Act. It 
also provides a valuable insight into how the community right to buy process operates, 
and highlights how diffi cult it is to challenge decisions made in relation to community 
applications.
A. THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
Part 2 of the Act gives communities in rural Scotland a pre-emptive right to buy land. 
A number of steps must be taken before communities can exercise this right, including 
formation of a community body, registration of a community interest in land, and 
activation of the right to buy when land subject to a registered community interest 
is exposed for sale.4 Each step requires a varying degree of involvement from the 
20 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbarn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 at 58.
1 All statutory references are to this Act unless otherwise stated.
2 Section 33(1) defi nes registrable land as “any land other than excluded land”, and the excluded land 
population level was set at 10,000 by the Community Right to Buy (Defi nition of Excluded Land) 
(Scotland) Order 2004, SSI 2004/296, now superseded by the Community Right to Buy (Defi nition of 
Excluded Land) (Scotland) Order 2006, SSI 2006/486. 
3 Holmehill Limited v The Scottish Ministers 2006 SLT (Sh Ct) 79. The headnote misleadingly refers to 
“Land registration”. All case references are to Holmehill unless otherwise stated.
4 No attempt is made here to explain the right to buy process in any detail. See further M M Combe, “The 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003: a defi nitive answer to the Scottish land question?” 2006 JR 195; A J 
M Steven and A Barr, “The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (Part 2)” (2003) 67 Greens Property Law 
ELR11_1_05_Analysis.indd   109 29/11/06   13:45:08
110 Vol 11 2007the edinburgh law review
Scottish Ministers. First, Ministers must confi rm that a community body is suitably 
constituted as a company limited by guarantee with a main purpose which is “consis-
tent with furthering the achievement of sustainable development”.5 Ministers must 
also decide whether or not a community interest is to be registered in the Register 
of Community Interests in Land, and must advise the Keeper accordingly. Finally, 
Ministers must consent to the exercise of the right to buy itself, after community 
members have approved the buyout in a ballot.6
Of these three stages, it is arguably the second (registration) where Ministerial 
consent is of most signifi cance. The fi rst stage is largely declaratory,7 while the criteria 
at the fi nal stage (exercise) are largely repetitive of previous provisions of the Act,8 so 
that it is diffi cult to visualise a scenario in which a community body – on the back of a 
ballot in favour of exercising the right to buy – would not be granted consent, unless 
there had been a major change in its management or structure.9
The registration stage is also crucial because of its implications for the landowner. 
After registration the landowner is forbidden from transferring the land other than in 
a manner compliant with the terms of the Act,10 thus making the community body the 
preferred, and effectively the only possible, bidder. In a concession to predictability 
in the marketplace, the legislation differentiates between punctual and “late” applica-
tions for registration, thus minimising disruption to a landowner seeking to transfer 
land not currently subject to a community interest. Where an application is timeous, 
i.e. before the land is exposed for sale, it falls under section 38 and the community 
must demonstrate only that there is support in the community for registration and that 
registration is in the public interest. Late applications, however, fall under section 39 
and must demonstrate that the level of support is “signifi cantly greater” than under 
section 38 and that the factors surrounding the application are “strongly indicative” of 
it being in the public interest, while further satisfying Ministers that there were good 
reasons for the application being late.11
Bulletin 3; K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2003 (2004) 131-141 (contributed by A J M 
Steven and A Barr).
5 Section 34(4).
6 Section 51(3).
7 With the exception of the sustainable development test. If Ministers do not confi rm that a body’s 
purposes are consistent with sustainable development, it is unclear what remedy is available to them: 
see Combe (n 4) at 220.
8 In s 51(3), the tests relating to whether the land is registrable and whether the purchase is in the public 
interest are repeated from ss 38 and 39, while s 51(3)(b) goes as far as to refer explicitly to compliance 
with the community body tests in s 34.  Section 51(3)(c) makes one of several references to sustainable 
development, this time with specifi c reference to what the community plans to do with the land, with 
the result that this test may be the one to which community bodies should pay most attention at the 
activation stage.
9 Section 51(3)(e).
10 Section 40(1).
11 Section 39.
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B. THE HOLMEHILL LITIGATION
The facts of Holmehill can be simply stated. A resident of the area in question, realising 
that land owned by Stakis Limited was for sale, felt that it would be benefi cial to the 
community for this to come into community ownership. A petition was gathered to 
evidence community support, eventually attracting 887 signatures from a possible 
6670 on the electoral roll.12 Holmehill Limited was incorporated as a community 
body, with Ministers confi rming on 15 February 2005 that the newly formed company 
complied with the sustainable development criterion set out in section 34. An appli-
cation for registration of a community interest in land was submitted shortly there-
after, under section 39, but was ultimately rejected.13 The Scottish Ministers felt good 
reasons had not been demonstrated for the application being late.14 They also felt that 
the factors surrounding the application were not strongly indicative of it being in the 
public interest but were only “fi nely balanced”.15 The “signifi cantly greater support” 
requirement16 was not referred to.
Section 61 of the Act provides for an appeal to the sheriff court against a Ministerial 
decision, and Holmehill Limited made use of this statutory appeal.17 From the outset, 
there was no question of the application being anything other than late, and that issue 
was not under appeal. It is clear the buyout concept was not even conceived until 
advertising hoardings were noticed, so the easier route under section 38 was never 
available. If it had been, the application would have led to registration.18
One interesting detail to note is that another community organisation, the Dunblane 
Development Trust, attempted to submit an application 26 days before Holmehill, but 
this was rejected as the Trust did not meet the criteria asked of a community body.19 
The requirement to incorporate as a company limited by guarantee has been criticised 
elsewhere,20 but this case highlights another possible criticism of the incorporation 
requirement. If land was not exposed for sale at the beginning of the incorporation 
process, but appeared on the market during the window occasioned by the need to 
form a suitable company, a community would be forced to traverse the more diffi cult 
section 39 route. Whether Ministers would classify a delay caused by incorporation as 
an example of a “good reason” is unclear.
Another point of interest is the approach adopted by the court in considering the 
appeal. The Act is silent as to the nature of the appeal conferred, and there was some 
12 Finding in fact 15. It seems these fi gures were amended downwards somewhat and those names 
who signed the petition under the pretence that the buyout was solely to prevent development were 
discounted, to remove the appearance that the buyout was a blocking measure rather than a precursor to 
sustainable development: see the remarks of  Richard Frew, for the Executive, summarised at 94 F-H.
13 Letter dated 5 April 2005, available, along with other relevant documentation, at http://rcil.ros.gov.
uk/RCIL/default.asp?Category=RCIL&Service=View&regnum=CB00016.
14 Section 39(3)(a).
15 Section 39(3)(c). See C below.
16 Section 39(3)(b).
17 Section 61(2)(a) allows a community body to appeal against a decision “that its community interest is not 
to be registered in the Register”.
18 Evidence of Richard Frew, summarised at 92 J.
19 The criteria are set out in s 34.
20 Combe (n 4) at 217-218.
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uncertainty as to how the court would handle the case.21 As it happened, the court 
adopted a narrow approach, refusing to reconsider the merits despite encourage-
ment from Holmehill’s counsel to do so.22 Such a limited approach severely curtailed 
Holmehill’s chances of success, and any future appeal against a Ministerial decision 
will face a similar test.23
It was accepted that the Carltona24 principles applied, with the result that decisions 
of the civil service were equated with those of the Scottish Ministers.25 While this 
point may be uncontroversial from a legal point of view, it has not escaped criticism 
from commentators. Andy Wightman, a land reform activist who appeared in the case 
as an expert witness for the pursuers, has been particularly critical of this aspect of 
the judgment.26 This may also be criticised from a more theoretical point of view, 
as discretion and property law tend to make unhappy bedfellows.27 Discretion often 
comes at the expense of certainty, so those exercising discretion must be beyond 
reproach. Sheriff McSherry, understandably, felt that it was not for him to replace the 
original decision with his own,28 but to describe the decision-makers as “duly consti-
tuted and elected”29 while in the same breath accepting the Carltona principles is 
slightly misleading. In the light of the legislative scheme, the sheriff’s approach is 
diffi cult to fault, but his decision serves to highlight the crucial role played by civil 
servants: whether they deserve that role is another matter entirely.
It is worth observing that late registrations are now more likely to be refused 
than in the days immediately following the enactment of the legislation. As of April 
2005, unawareness of the legislation is no longer regarded as a valid reason for not 
submitting a timeous registration.30 Bearing in mind his overall approach, it is perhaps 
21 There seems to be an absence of recent authority on this issue, a point acknowledged by Sheriff McSh-
erry, at 96 L, with reference to I D Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice, 2nd edn, by C G B Nicholson and A 
L Stewart (1998) vol 1, para 25.11. Of the authorities the sheriff considered, the approach of Lord Emslie 
in Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345 found favour (97 D-G).
22 A comparison between s 68(6) of the draft Bill, which was limited to “procedural requirements”, and the 
more open wording of s 61 was made in an attempt to convince the sheriff that the appeal procedure as 
enacted was intended to be wide, but this approach failed: see 96 C-E.
23 See further M Shaw, “Right to buy and the planning process”, 16 May 2006, available at http://www.
biggartbaillie.co.uk//righttobuyandtheplanningprocess.aspx.
24 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560.
25 See 97 J-L, with reference to Somerville v Scottish Ministers 2005 CSOH 24. See further Rt Hon Colin 
Boyd QC, “Ministers and the Law” 2006 JR 179 at 189-190. 
26 Wightman describes the role of civil servants, combined with the narrow approach adopted by the 
court, as “potentially worrying since this group has no professional expertise in the areas of land tenure, 
community development, planning or sustainable development and Ministers in practice follow their 
recommendations...This leaves the land reform process vulnerable to the inadequacies of a decision 
making process that lacks any kind of structured and analytical decision making and to the political 
whims of Ministers who can write their own guidance and determine their own policy intentions”: see 
http://www.landreformact.com/docs/judgement_response1a.pdf.
27 C Rotheram, Proprietary Remedies in Context (2002) 253: a “dreaded juridical phenomenon: a discre-
tionary proprietary remedy.” 
28 As he noted (at 96 J-K): “To do so would involve me in exercising my discretion in a matter within my 
local jurisdiction...this would not sit well with ensuring consistency of decision making throughout Scot-
land and I do not believe that this is the proper approach”.
29 At 96 I.
30 Evidence of Richard Frew, summarised at 95 D.
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 unsurprising that the sheriff was reluctant to interfere with the decision that Holme-
hill Limited had not provided “good” reasons for the delay, noting that there was 
“nothing in the reasons given...amounting to good reason when considered in light 
of the policy principles [of the Act]”.31 If such a view is adopted in future cases – 
where the policy principle against late registration is elevated above that of increasing 
community ownership of land – it is diffi cult to imagine any reasons for lateness being 
accepted as good.32
Another interesting aspect of the Holmehill case is that, somewhat inexplicably, 
Ministers failed to give as a reason for their refusal the lack of “signifi cantly greater 
support” in the community than would have been required for an application under 
section 38.33 Sheriff McSherry found this particularly striking, noting that:34
it is a mystery…why the Scottish Ministers regarded 13.62 per cent as being signifi cantly 
greater support than 10 per cent and did not refuse the application on that ground. However, 
I concede that it is for them to exercise their discretion in this respect.
This observation leads naturally to a follow-on question: what would have happened if 
the other two tests had somehow been met and a landowner wished to appeal against 
a failure to reject under the “signifi cantly greater” test? Apparently the landowner 
would have been unsuccessful.
C. PUBLIC INTEREST, THE PLANNING PROCESS 
AND THE FAIRLIE DISPUTE
Despite suggestions that Holmehill was the fi rst application under section 61 of the 
Act, this honour seems to fall on a case involving the Earl of Glasgow and a community 
in Fairlie, but on that occasion the application was made by the landowner.35 Interest-
ingly, the Executive in this instance were arguing for registration, and the arguments 
raised in the pleadings of the Fairlie case make for an intriguing read alongside the 
Holmehill judgment.36
In Holmehill, there was a perception that the community’s plan to acquire ownership 
was in fact an attempt to “thwart” the planning process.37 Richard Frew, the Scottish 
Executive’s only witness in the case, seemed to be of the view that any attempts to 
acquire ownership while alternative plans were in place were to be discouraged. He 
noted that “the planning system was already there to prevent development that was 
31 At 101 B.
32 Andy Wightman has been critical of this aspect of the judgment, observing that “[t]he late registration 
provisions of the Act are...to all intents and purposes useless”: see http://www.landreformact.com/docs/
judgement_response1a.pdf.
33 Section 39(3)(b).
34 At 101 K.
35 See further J Watson, “Villagers vow to tackle earl over land sale” Scotland on Sunday 23 October 
2005.
36 The Right Honourable Patrick Boyle, The Earl of Glasgow v Fairlie Land Acquisition Company Ltd and 
The Scottish Ministers, Kilmarnock Sheriff Court (ref B594/05).
37 See the decision notice under s 37(17) dated 5 April 2006, available at http://rcil.ros.gov.uk/RCIL2/
CB00016/Ministerial%20decision%20Notice%20under%20s37(17)%20050405.pdf and quoted at 2006 
SLT (Sh Ct) 79 at 81 K - 82 A.
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not compatible with the public interest. The policy intention was not to allow the right 
to buy to subvert the planning system”.38 This point was taken up by Sheriff McSherry, 
who observed that: 39
The practical effect of ownership, once accomplished, is to give the owner control over 
land use and a veto over development that the owner does not like. The community right 
to buy had the potential to subvert the planning process…[I]n the real world, I would think 
it unlikely that the planning process would be commenced or continued with, for example, 
in respect of an application to allow housebuilding, if the developer was aware that the land 
was subject to a community right to buy.
In the Fairlie case, the land was subject to an unadopted local plan within the 
terms of section 11 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997. Here, the 
issue was not the “thwarting” of the planning process by the community. Instead, it 
was argued for the pursuer that “the proposal brought forward by Fairlie is intended 
to thwart the development of the site as was proposed by him by way of objection to 
the Local Plan”.40 In the Executive’s reply to these pleadings, it was noted that “the 
application to register a community interest by Fairlie was not made to subvert the 
public interest, rather to promote it. The operation of the local plan process is not a 
reason for the second defenders to refuse to register an interest in the RCIL pursuant 
to the 2003 Act.”41 On this point, it should also be noted that the Scottish Executive’s 
guidance for community bodies states that “inclusion in [a] local plan should not, of 
itself, prevent the land from being registered”.42
This divorce from planning law is in direct contrast to the approach of the Execu-
tive in Holmehill. Read side by side, these two approaches highlight the absurdity 
of confl ating the planning process with the right to buy: while one community was 
criticised for thwarting the planning process, the other was criticised for thwarting the 
chance to object. In fact, the position adopted in Holmehill seems highly damaging to 
the effectiveness of the right to buy. When rural land is transferred, it is not uncommon 
for a change of use to be proposed (the scenario of a farmer selling a fi eld to a devel-
oper being a prime example). Holmehill seems to suggest that, once planning permis-
sion is obtained for a development, or perhaps even before, the development is viewed 
as being in the public interest, and resistance by way of a community buyout is no 
longer permitted, regardless of the relative merit of an alternative proposal.43
The Executive’s pleadings in Fairlie distinguished the registration stage from the 
exercise stage, noting that it would be the later stage where44
38 Evidence of Richard Frew, summarised at 93 K-L.
39 At 101 J-K.
40 Earl of Glasgow v Fairlie Land Acquisition Co Ltd, Condescendence 3(a).
41 Earl of Glasgow v Fairlie Land Acquisition Co Ltd, Answers 3(a).
42 Community Right to Buy: Guidance for Community Bodies para 30, available at http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/library5/rural/lracrb-00.asp.
43 See R R M Paisley, “Tenants statutory rights to buy and similar rights”, unpublished paper presented 
on 31 Aug 2006 at the Second Biennial Conference of the Centre for Property Law at the University of 
Aberdeen.
44 Earl of Glasgow v Fairlie Land Acquisition Co Ltd, Answers 3(a).
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competing interests between the parties would be weighed up and consent either granted 
or refused on the basis of which of them was in the best interests of the community ... The 
pursuer’s competing interests and the as yet unadopted local plan are not valid grounds upon 
which the second defenders would have been entitled to decline to register the community 
interest in the land as sought by Fairlie.
Again, this can be contrasted with the approach in Holmehill. After considering the 
policy reasons behind the Act, Sheriff McSherry felt a strict approach to late regis-
tration was justifi ed, as granting late applications as of right “would be akin to an 
automatic right of pre-emption and direct intervention in the live land market”.45
With respect, this view loses sight of the fact that the right is not automatic but 
is subject to further assessment at the exercise stage.46 Arguably the public interest 
is better gauged at the exercise stage, with its compulsory ballot,47 than at the regis-
tration stage. A strong presumption against late applications would deny community 
bodies their best chance of proving that a buyout is indeed in the public interest. 
One way of preventing this in future would be to amend the Act by shifting the extra 
burden placed on late applicants to the exercise stage rather than the registration 
stage. Such an approach would make registration largely declaratory, and available to 
all communities before a landowner concludes missives,48 while allowing the higher 
“strongly indicative” threshold of public interest to be gauged more accurately after 
a campaign and ballot on the issue. Admittedly this could lead to delays for selling 
landowners, but this could be offset by requiring a ballot in a shorter time frame for 
late applications.
The conclusion to the Fairlie litigation is somewhat cryptic; indeed, the only refer-
ence to it in the public domain seems to be a letter held in the Register of Com munity 
Interests in Land from the Executive to the community body with an attached inter-
locutor, which states that Sheriff McDonald at Kilmarnock ordered the deletion of 
the community interest on 23 January 2006.49 The interlocutor seems to grant both 
of the pursuer’s pleas-in-law, namely for recall of the decision and for rectifi cation of 
the Register of Community Interests in Land, despite initial representations that the 
remedy of recall was not competent.50 This followed a joint motion for the pursuer 
and the second respondent. That the case should conclude with such a confused 
joint motion is perhaps fi tting when one considers the mysterious capitulation of the 
respondents’ legal case.
45 At 99 A. 
46 This is despite recognition early in the judgment, at 82 I, that the appeal concerned the registration stage 
rather than the exercise stage.
47 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 s 51(1)(a), (2).
48 Using this approach, the requirements of an amended s 38 would be limited to confi rming a number of 
points such as that the land in question is registrable and that the community has a substantial connection 
to it.
49 Available at http://rcil.ros.gov.uk/RCIL2/CB00020/Fairlie%20Rejection%20Letter%20070206.pdf.
50 In Fairlie the respondents’ fi rst plea in law read “[t]he remedy of recall of the decision of the Scottish 
Ministers not being competent in terms of the 2003 Act, the action should be dismissed”.
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D. CONCLUSION
Following the Holmehill decision, one MSP was moved to say the ruling “appears 
to drive a coach and horses through the original spirit of the Land Reform Act, which 
was designed to encourage local communities to take control over key local assets”.51 
When taken with the unsuccessful bid in Fairlie, Holmehill seems to suggest that the 
community right to buy is not leading to community empowerment and tangible land 
reform,52 especially when a community body is faced with a well-argued, and well -
funded, challenge by the landowner.53
After Holmehill, it would take a brave community to launch an appeal against a 
Ministerial refusal to register a late application. In this regard it is unfortunate that 
the Fairlie dispute did not produce a written judgment which might have served as 
a counterbalance to Holmehill. Communities attempting a buyout face a diffi cult 
enough task already. A restrictive approach to community appeals makes a challenging 
process more challenging still.
Malcolm M Combe
University of Aberdeen
The author would like to thank Professor Roderick R M Paisley and Professor David L 
Carey Miller for their encouragement and support.
51 www.markruskellmsp.org/news/2006/may/20060501holme.htm.
52 That there is a lack of real change in the Scottish land market is refl ected in the opening article of 
Strutt and Parker’s Scottish Estates Review 2006, by Andrew Hamilton, appropriately entitled “Plenty 
of reform, but how much actual change?”
53 See I MacKinnon, “Land reform for all – except when big business is selling” West Highland Free Press 
9 June 2006, available at http://www.whfp.com/1780/focus.html.
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